

Formal Ontology and Natural Language Semantics

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Summary

- Ontology and semantics
- The ontological commitment of natural language
- The role of *formal* ontology
- The basic tools of formal ontological analysis
- Some language-motivated ontological choices
- The DOLCE ontology

Ontology and semantics

- Strictly intertwined: ontology is about *what there is*, semantics is about *referring* to what there is...
- Structural semantics vs. referential semantics
- Different focuses for semanticists:
 - Complex sentences
 - Primitive sentences
 - Quantifiers and modifiers
 - Prepositions
 - Nouns and verbs

↑
Increasing
ontological
assumptions
↓

The ontological commitment of natural language

- Every natural language [or maybe every contextualized sentence] *commits* to some ontology, in two ways [Talmy 2000]:
 - Through a *closed* system of grammatical features
 - Through an *open* system of lexemes
- "Ontological semantics" [Nirenburg & Raskin 2004]: the semantics is driven by an ontology.

Which ontology for NL?

- Quine: every (logical) theory commits to the class of entities it *quantifies on*.
- Problems:
 - Should every common noun correspond to an ontological category?
 - *Questionable entities*: Events, features, qualities, fictional characters...
 - Should different linguistic behaviors mark different ontological categories?

Descriptive vs. Revisionary Approach

- *Descriptive*: surface semantic structure of sentences is preserved (as best as possible)
- *Revisionary*: ontological eliminativism based on *paraphrasability*:
 - There is a hole in this wall
 - This wall is holed
 - John gives a kiss to Mary
 - John kisses Mary
 - John gives a flower to Mary
 - *John flowers Mary
 - This statue has a long nose
 - This statue is long-nosed

Two forms of revisionism [Varzi]

- Hermeneutic (re-interpretational) revisionism
 - What these words *really mean* is...
 - Serious troubles...
 - Holes exist -> something is holed
 - Holes do not exist -> nothing is holed ?!
- Revolutionary revisionism
 - What *we intend to say* with these words is... (Humpty-Dumpty style)

The traps of (revolutionary) revisionism

- Is *systematic* paraphrasing really possible (also for complex sentences)?
 - There are 7 holes in this piece of cheese
- How to choose *whether* paraphrasing?
 - Mary makes a leap
 - Mary makes a cake
- Can we account for *proper inferences*?
 - There are two things John gave to Mary: a kiss and a flower
- *Where to stop* while eliminating entities?
 - Should we paraphrase everything in terms of bunches of molecules moving around?

An obvious (descriptive) distinction: Objects vs. Events

- Jones buttered the toast
 - Butter(Jones, toast)
- Jones buttered the toast with the knife
 - Butter(Jones, toast, knife)
- Jones buttered the toast with the knife in the bathroom
 - Butter(Jones, toast, knife, bathroom)
- Problem: *multiple meaning postulates*
 - Butter2(x, y, z) → Butter1(x, y)
 - Butter3(x, y, z, t) → Butter2(x, y, z) . . .
- Solution: *Reifying events* [Davidson]
 - $\exists e$ Butter(e, Jones, toast)
 - $\exists e$ (Butter(e, Jones, toast) \wedge With(e, knife))
- Advantages:
 - Event anaphora: *It happened at midnight*
 - event nominalization: *The buttering was slow*
 - Predication over events: *I enjoyed reading the book*

The rich ontology of Natural Language

Multiple *co-located events*

- *John sings while taking a shower*

Multiple *co-located objects*

- I am talking here
- *This bunch of molecules is talking
- *What's here now is talking

- This statue is looking at me
- *This piece of marble is looking at me
- This statue has a strange nose
- *This piece of marble has a strange nose

Individual *qualities*

- The temperature of this room is increasing
- I like the color of this rose
- The color of this rose turned from red to brown in one week

The role of formal ontology

Once the basic choices are made, how to characterize slight differences in ontological assumptions?

The importance of subtle distinctions

"Trying to engage with *too many partners too fast* is one of the main reasons that *so many online market makers have founded*. The transactions they had viewed as simple and routine actually involved many *subtle distinctions in terminology and meaning*"

Harvard Business Review, October 2001

Where subtle distinctions in meaning are important

- US elections: how many *holes*?
- Twin towers catastrophe: how many *events*?

...only *ontological analysis* solves these problems!!

Ontology and ontologies

- Ontology (capital "o"):
 - a *philosophical discipline*:
 - The study of the *nature and structure* of *possible* entities
- An ontology (lowercase "o"):
 - a *specific artifact* designed with the purpose of *expressing the intended meaning of a vocabulary* in terms of the nature and structure of the entities it *refers* to

What is an ontology?

- An *artifact* designed with the purpose of expressing the *intended meaning* of a (shared) *vocabulary*
- A *shared* vocabulary plus a specification (*characterization*) of its intended meaning

"An ontology is a specification of a conceptualization"
[Gruber 95]


i.e., an ontology accounts for the *commitment* of a language to a *certain conceptualization*

What is a conceptualization


- Formal structure of (a piece of) reality as perceived and organized by an agent, independently of:
 - the **vocabulary** used
 - the actual occurrence of a specific **situation**
- Different situations involving same objects, described by different vocabularies, may share the same conceptualization.





Ontologies and intended meaning



Ontology Quality: Precision and Coverage







- ### Ontologies vs. Knowledge Bases
- Knowledge base
 - Assertional component
 - reflects *specific (epistemic) states of affairs*
 - designed for *problem-solving*
 - Terminological component (*ontology*)
 - *independent* of particular *states of affairs*
 - Designed to support *terminological services*
- Ontological formulas are (assumed to be) *necessarily true*

Ontologies vs. classifications

- Classifications focus on:
 - *access*, based on pre-determined criteria (encoded by *syntactic keys*)
- Ontologies focus on:
 - *Meaning* of terms
 - *Nature* and *structure* of a domain

Formal Ontology

- Theory of *formal distinctions and connections* within:
 - entities of the world, as we perceive it (*particulars*)
 - categories we use to talk about such entities (*universals*)
- Why *formal*?
 - Two meanings: *rigorous* and *general*
 - Formal logic: connections between truths - neutral wrt *truth*
 - Formal ontology: connections between things - neutral wrt *reality*

The need for general ontological primitives

Formal Ontological Analysis

- Theory of Essence and Identity
- Theory of Parts (Mereology)
- Theory of Wholes
- Theory of Dependence
- Theory of Composition and Constitution
- Theory of Qualities
- Theory of Participation
- Theory of Representation



The basis for a common ontology vocabulary

No axioms, no semantics...

- No axioms, "free" interpretations
- Free interpretations = NO semantics
- Encoding primitive "formal" relations with no axioms does not solve anything

An example: mereology

- Primitive: *proper part-of* relation (PP)
 - asymmetric
 - transitive
 - $Pxy =_{def} PPxy \vee x=y$

• Further axioms:

supplementation: $PPxy \rightarrow \exists z (PPzy \wedge \neg z=x)$

principle of sum: $\exists z (PPxz \wedge PPyz \wedge \neg \exists w (PPwz \wedge \neg (Pwx \vee Pwy)))$


extensionality: $x = y \leftrightarrow (Pwx \leftrightarrow Pwy)$

Excluded models:



Unity, Identity, and Essence

- **Unity**: is the collar part of my dog?
 - *Being a topological whole* is an essential property of my dog
- **Identity**: is this my dog?
 - Essential properties allow us to keep track of my dog across time
 - Individual essential properties of *my dog*
 - Generic essential properties of *dogs*



Abstracting domain elements from situations

- Humans isolate *relevant invariances* on the basis of:
 - Perception (as resulting from evolution)
 - Cognition and cultural experience
 - Language
- A set of *percepts* is associated to each situation
- Synchronic level: **spatial invariants**
 - Unity properties are ascribed to **percepts patterns**: topological and morphological *wholes* emerge
 - Salient features are recognized
- Diachronic level: **temporal invariants**
 - *Continuants*: identity assumptions among *percepts patterns* belonging to different situations
 - *Occurrents*: unity properties ascribed to *percepts patterns* belonging to different situations
- Experience level
 - Categories of continuants are constructed, marked by their *essential properties*

Kinds of Whole

- Depending on the nature of the *unifying relation*, we can distinguish:
 - *Topological wholes* (a piece of coal, a lump of coal)
 - *Morphological wholes* (a constellation)
 - *Functional wholes* (a hammer, a bikini)
 - *Social wholes* (a population)
- * a whole can have *parts that are themselves wholes* (with a different unifying relation)

The role of essential properties

- The emergence of invariant properties is a fact of life
- Essential properties are often result of *conventions* reflecting these invariances
- Ascription of essential properties reflects the need to
 - explore *alternatives* to categorize things
 - extrapolate from experience
 - Create expectations

Incompatible essential properties are *disjoint*


Ontological dependence and systematic polysemy

- Book: text/physical object
- Window: opening/artifact
- Apple: fruit/substance
-
- Separation lexicon/ontology [cf. Niremburg, Wilks]

DOLCE

a Descriptive Ontology for Linguistic and Cognitive Engineering

- Strong cognitive bias: *descriptive* (as opposite to *prescriptive*) attitude
- Emphasis on *cognitive invariants*
- Categories as *conceptual containers*: no "deep" metaphysical implications wrt "true" reality
- Clear *branching points* to allow easy comparison with different ontological options
- *Rich axiomatization*
 - 37 basic categories
 - 7 basic relations
 - 80 axioms, 100 definitions, 20 theorems



Endurance vs. Perdurant

- **Endurants:**
 - All proper parts are present whenever they are present (*wholly presence*, no temporal parts)
 - Exist in time
 - Can genuinely change in time
 - Need a time-indexed parthood relation
- **Perdurants:**
 - Only some proper parts are present whenever they are present (*partial presence*, temporal parts)
 - Happen in time
 - Do not change in time
 - Do not need a time-indexed parthood relation

Qualities and qualia

- Linguistic evidence
 - *This rose is red*
 - *Red is a color*
 - *This rose has a color*
 - *The color of this rose turned to brown in one week*
 - *The room's temperature is increasing*
 - *Red is opposite to green and close to brown*
- Every entity comes with certain qualities that permanently *inhere* to it and are *unique* of it
- Qualities are perceptually mapped into *qualia*, which are regions of *quality spaces*.
- Properties hold because qualities have certain locations in their quality spaces.
- Each *quality type* has its own quality space

Qualities




The rose and the chair have *the same color*:

- different color qualities inhere to the two objects
- they are located in the same quality region

Therefore, the same color attribute (red) is ascribed to the two objects

Qualities



Qualities vs. Features



- **Features:** "parasitic" physical entities.
- **relevant parts** of their host...
... or **places**
- Features have qualities, qualities have no features.

Abstract vs. Concrete Entities

- Concrete: located in space-time (regions of space-time are located in themselves)
- Abstract - two meanings:
 - Result of an abstraction process (something common to multiple exemplifications)
 - * *Not located in space-time*
- Mereological sums (of concrete entities) are concrete, the corresponding sets are abstract...

Physical vs. Non-physical Object



FIAT SpA

- Physical objects:
 - *inherent spatial localization*
 - *not dependent on other objects (physical objects, like cars) or no inherent localization and be dependent on agents (non-physical objects, like laws and institutions).*
- Non-physical objects can also be divided into *mental* (depending on *singular agents*) and *social* (depending on *communities of agents*).

Different roles of ontologies

- **Community-based access (lightweight ontologies)**
 - Intended meaning of terms *known in advance*
 - *Taxonomic reasoning* is the main ontology service
 - *Limited expressivity*
 - *On-line reasoning* (stringent computational requirements)
- **Global knowledge access (foundational ontologies)**
 - *Negotiate meaning* across different communities
 - *Establish consensus* about meaning of a new term within a community
 - *Explain meaning* of a term to somebody new to community
 - *Higher expressivity* required to express intended meaning
 - *Off-line reasoning* (only needed *once*, before cooperation process starts)

An Interdisciplinary Approach

- Towards a unified *Ontology-driven Modelling Methodology* for databases, knowledge bases and OO-systems
 - Grounded in reality
 - Transparent to people
 - Rigorous
 - General
- Based on
 - Logic
 - Philosophy
 - Linguistics
 - Cognitive science

Research priorities at the ISTC-CNR Laboratory for Applied Ontology



- Foundational ontologies and ontological analysis
- Domain ontologies
 - Physical objects
 - Information and information processing
 - Social interaction
 - Ontology of legal and financial entities
- Ontology, language, cognition
- Ontology-driven information systems
 - Ontology-driven conceptual modeling
 - Ontology-driven information access
 - Ontology-driven information integration

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
Application of DOLCE (1) WordNet alignment and OntoWordNet

- 809 synsets from WordNet1.6 directly subsumed by a DOLCE+D&S class
 - Whole WordNet linked to DOLCE+D&S
 - Lower taxonomy levels in WordNet still need revision
- Glosses being transformed into DOLCE+ axioms
 - Machine learning applied jointly with foundational ontology
- WordNet "domains" being used to create a modular, general purpose domain ontology
- Ongoing work on ontological analysis of specific WordNet domains (cognition, emotion, psychological feature)

Applications of DOLCE (2) Core Ontologies

based on DOLCE, D&S, and OntoWordNet

- Core ontology of plans and guidelines
- Core ontology of (Web) services
- Core ontology of service-level agreements
- Core ontology of (bank) transactions (anti-money-laundering)
- Core ontology for the Italian legal lexicon
- Core ontology of regulatory compliance
- Core ontology of fishery (FAO's Agriculture Ontology Service)
- Core ontology of biomedical terminologies (UMLS)



Foundational ontologies

- Provide a *carefully crafted taxonomic backbone* to be used for domain ontologies
- Help recognizing and understanding *disagreements* as well as agreements
- Improve ontology development *methodology*
- Provide a principled mechanism for the semantic integration and *harmonisation* of existing ontologies and metadata standards
- Improve the *trust* on web services

Mutual understanding vs. mass interoperability

The multiplicative approach

- The same physical process can participate to multiple equivalence relationships
- Multiple continuants can be located in the same field region
- *Multiplication of continuants* is motivated by our cognitive needs

Physical processes vs. events

- A person moves, its body moves. Two (three?) co-located events, one physical process.
- *Once* we have constructed continuants, *then* we focus on the events they participate...

When precision is not enough

Only one binary predicate in the language: *on*

Only blocks in the domain: *a, b, c, ...*

Axioms (for all x, y, z):


$$on(x, y) \rightarrow \neg on(y, x)$$

$$on(x, y) \rightarrow \neg \exists z (on(x, z) \wedge on(z, y))$$

Non-intended *models* are excluded, but the rules for the competent usage of *on* in different *situations* are not captured.



Excluded situations



Indistinguishable situations

Precision vs. Accuracy

- In general, a single intended *model* may not discriminate among relevant alternative *situations* because of
 - Lack of *primitives*
 - Lack of *entities*
- Capturing all intended models is not sufficient for a "perfect" ontology
 - Precision*: non-intended *models* are excluded
 - Accuracy*: non-intended *situations* are excluded
